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Preliminary Kpler ship-tracking data showed just three visible commodity-vessel crossings of the Strait of Hormuz on Wednesday, September 16, down from 12 on Tuesday and roughly 82% below the latest 10-day average of about 17 per day. The movements consisted of an empty Supramax dry-bulk carrier entering through the Iranian route, an empty petroleum-products tanker entering on a dark route and a Panamax tanker exiting on a dark route. The count does not include vessels that may have crossed with Automatic Identification System transponders switched off, and Kpler's daily figures can change as tracking data is reconciled. Traffic through Bab el-Mandeb also fell to 21 crossings from 24 a day earlier. The drop comes as the Gulf conflict, attacks on shipping and energy infrastructure, restricted transit patterns and sharply higher insurance costs continue to constrain a chokepoint that carried about 20.9 million barrels per day of oil and more than 20% of global LNG trade in the first half of 2025
Visible Commodity Traffic Falls to Three Ships
The latest preliminary Kpler snapshot shows an exceptionally small number of observable commodity-vessel movements through the Gulf's principal maritime chokepoint.
The latest Kpler count for Tuesday was 12 visible commodity-vessel transits.
Wednesday's visible count was less than one-fifth of the latest short-term average.
The product tanker entering and Panamax tanker exiting were both identified by Kpler as using dark routes.
Traffic through the second major regional chokepoint eased from 24 vessels a day earlier.
Ships that transit with AIS switched off may not appear in the published crossing count.
Hormuz Operational Exposure Board
The visible vessel count is only one layer of the disruption. Reduced crossings interact with energy flows, insurance pricing, shipowner willingness and increasingly constrained alternative export routes.
| Indicator | Latest Reading | Observed Change | Shipping Exposure | Market Connection | Data Qualification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hormuz Visible Commodity Traffic | WEDNESDAY 3 Crossings September 16 preliminary Kpler count. | Down from 12 on Tuesday and versus a latest 10-day average of approximately 17. | Only one observable dry-bulk movement and two tanker movements were identified in the latest snapshot. | Fewer visible crossings reduce immediately observable export and import movements and increase scheduling uncertainty around loading, delivery and vessel positioning. | AIS-off vessels are excluded. Kpler daily figures remain preliminary and can change when tracking information is reconciled. |
| Bab el-Mandeb Traffic | WEDNESDAY 21 Crossings | Down from 24 a day earlier. | The Red Sea route is also operating under heightened military and security pressure. | Simultaneous constraints around Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb reduce routing flexibility across both sides of the Arabian Peninsula. | Bab el-Mandeb count covers the daily vessel crossings tracked by Kpler in the Reuters report. |
| Historical Hormuz Oil Flow | 1H 2025 20.9M b/d | Equivalent to approximately 20% of global petroleum-liquids consumption. | Crude, condensate and refined-product tankers historically depend heavily on the waterway. | EIA estimates approximately one-quarter of globally traded seaborne oil moved through Hormuz in the first half of 2025. | Historical reference, not a claim that 20.9M b/d is currently moving through the strait. |
| 2Q 2026 Oil Flow | EIA ESTIMATE 4.9M b/d | Down from 21.6M b/d in 4Q 2025 before the 2026 disruption. | Illustrates the scale of the broader decline in physical oil movement through Hormuz during the conflict. | Alternative pipelines can replace only part of normal Gulf export capacity. | Quarterly EIA estimate based on tanker-tracking data and distinct from Kpler's daily vessel-count metric. |
| Historical LNG Flow | 1H 2025 11.4 Bcf/d | More than 20% of global LNG trade passed through Hormuz, predominantly from Qatar. | LNG carrier access directly affects Qatar and UAE exports and supply availability for Asian and European buyers. | Qatar was historically the dominant LNG exporter through the strait. | Historical EIA benchmark. |
| 2Q 2026 LNG Flow | EIA ESTIMATE 0.8 Bcf/d | Down sharply from 10.5 Bcf/d in 4Q 2025. | Reduced Gulf LNG availability has forced buyers toward alternative Atlantic Basin and Pacific supply. | Reuters reported roughly 36 million tonnes of LNG supply lost since the conflict began. | Quarterly estimate and not directly comparable with the three-ship daily crossing count. |
| Transit Insurance Cost | SEPTEMBER Up to 6% | ENOC executive Paul Bradshaw said cargo insurance can reach as much as 6% of cargo value. | Insurance costs can materially alter voyage economics even when physical transit remains possible. | Reuters reported total transit-related costs of roughly $10M to $20M in some cases, while some participants have considered going uninsured. | These are reported upper-end market observations rather than a universal tariff applying to every vessel. |
| Alternative Oil Routes | PIPELINE BYPASS ~4.7M b/d | EIA estimates combined Saudi and UAE bypass capacity at approximately 4.7M b/d. | Pipelines reduce reliance on Hormuz but cannot replicate its full historical oil throughput. | Saudi Arabia's East-West system has itself faced disruption, increasing pressure on the remaining bypass capacity. | Capacity figure is a structural benchmark and does not imply that all 4.7M b/d is currently available or fully utilized. |
Hormuz Transit Suppression & Cost Analyzer
Model how a sustained reduction in visible daily crossings could accumulate deferred vessel movements, then test the insurance cost on an individual cargo.
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