The 10 Shipping Trades Where Vessel Choice Has Changed Because Freight Got Too Expensive

Reuters identified CPC's smaller-vessel purchases as Asian refiners worked around record spot freight. Six Aframaxes represent about 3.6 million barrels at a 600,000-barrel planning capacity. That is not an exact cargo-for-cargo substitution for two or three VLCCs, but it is clear evidence of a change in buying pattern. [1]

A shipbroker cited SK Energy chartering Samos to load U.S. crude in early November. The unit-cost calculation uses representative Aframax capacity, not a confirmed bill of lading. The key benefit may be executable tonnage and parcel flexibility, not an automatic saving versus every VLCC quote. [1]

Reuters reported Cosmo Oil's provisional VLCC charter and Trafigura's Aframax charter for November U.S. loadings. One Aframax does not replace one VLCC; four are needed to move a two-million-barrel program at 600,000-barrel capacity. At $24M each, that would be $96M before accounting for a partial final parcel, so the switch is about cargo size and access, not proof of fleet-wide savings. [2][3]

Lloyd's List reported that limited ballast VLCC availability drove charterers to split Atlantic cargo stems into Suezmax parcels. Its October 5 assessment also showed extraordinary Suezmax earnings, so the economics can reverse quickly as the smaller class absorbs overflow demand. The break-even figure is a mathematical comparison, not a reported Suezmax quote for the exact VLCC route. [4][6]

Kpler found that the VLCC freight premium made cargo splitting more attractive: West Africa eastbound Suezmax volumes rebounded to roughly 520,000 barrels per day, while long-haul East Asia activity reached about 130,000 barrels per day. These are regional flow rates, not a count of verified individual switches. [6]

Vitol estimated roughly 80 VLCCs tied to Hormuz shuttle activity. Lloyd's List cited seven-to-ten-day Gulf of Oman STS waits in early October. The bottleneck changes the number of hulls needed per delivered barrel: high nominal VLCC capacity produces fewer annual deliveries when ships repeatedly wait for transfer windows. Security risk, not just headline freight, drives this configuration. [1][4]

Reuters reported ADNOC selling coming-month cargoes on delivered terms to buyers in China and India, with Aramco also supplying delivered barrels. This is a vessel-control switch rather than proof of a change in hull size. The refiner still pays a landed price reflecting freight economics; the freight exposure moves into the seller's execution model. [1]

Kpler estimated about 20% of the clean LR2 pool was removed at the peak of switching. A coated LR2 is not mechanically converted into a new ship class; the same tanker accepts dirty cargo employment, and reversing the change requires commercial, tank-cleaning and cargo-compatibility decisions. As a consequence, reduced clean LR2 supply is pushing some future product demand toward smaller MRs, a projection rather than a verified one-to-one substitution. [5][6]

Reuters identified transfers including GasLog Shanghai to GasLog Savannah, Al Rekayyat to Tembek for India, and Mraweh to LNG Enugu for Japan. This was a security and transit-workaround decision, not evidence that LNG spot charter hire has become exorbitant: the Baltic's U.S. Gulf-to-Japan LNG benchmark remained $49,000/day. LNG STS requires specialized transfer capability and cannot be equated with oil STS. [8][9]