Saudi Arabia confirmed on November 9, 2026, that its East–West crude oil pipeline was attacked in the Madinah region, causing a limited fire that emergency teams extinguished without reported injuries or fatalities. The Ministry of Energy said pipeline operations continued without interruption and did not identify those responsible. The approximately 1,200-kilometre pipeline carries crude from eastern Saudi Arabia to Yanbu on the Red Sea, providing an alternative to exports through the Strait of Hormuz. The system has a stated maximum capacity of about 7 million barrels per day, and Reuters estimates that Saudi Arabia has rerouted approximately 4 million barrels per day through it during the regional shipping crisis. The latest attack follows a September incident that temporarily halted pipeline operations and disrupted tanker loading at Yanbu.
ShipUniverse | November 9 Saudi Pipeline Incident
Saudi Arabia's Hormuz Bypass Comes Under Fire Again
A new attack was reported against the East-West crude pipeline in the Madinah region. Saudi authorities say the limited fire was extinguished and the system continued operating.
7.0M
Barrels/day nameplate
Reported maximum pipeline capacity, not November 9 measured throughput
1,200
Kilometre corridor
Cross-country connection from eastern Saudi Arabia to Yanbu
0
Reported interruption
The Saudi Energy Ministry says operations were unaffected by the latest attack
How the alternative oil route works
01 / Eastern production
Abqaiq regionCrude supplies originate from Saudi Arabia's eastern oil production and processing system.
→
02 / Inland transportation
East-West PipelineCross-country transport bypasses the need to send these barrels through Hormuz.
→
03 / Red Sea outlet
YanbuCrude supplies tankers and regional refining infrastructure on the western coast.
Functional route illustration, not a geographic or engineering diagram. Pipeline throughput, refinery supplies and tanker loading volumes should be measured separately.
What is confirmed, and what remains undisclosed
Confirmed by Saudi authorities
The pipeline was targeted November 9 in the Madinah region. A limited fire was brought under control, no casualties were reported, and operations were described as unaffected.
Not established by the statement
The attacker, weapon, full damage assessment, repair costs, exact facility affected and verified post-incident flow readings were not disclosed.
Four developments behind the new incident
SEP 2026
Previous pipeline shutdown
Attacks interrupted the line and temporarily stopped Yanbu crude loading.
OCT 6
Throughput recovery
Saudi Energy Minister reported pipeline flow reaching 5.8 million bpd.
NOV 3
Aramco expansion review
The company confirmed further export flexibility and storage options were under study.
NOV 9
Another attack reported
Limited fire extinguished. Ministry reports no operational disruption.
Evidence and dates: Saudi Ministry of Energy statement carried by SPA on November 9; Reuters November 9; Aramco November 3 results; Saudi Energy Minister October 6. Reported operating status is attributed to the ministry. October throughput is not a November 9 measurement.
ShipUniverse | Tanker Supply-Chain Intelligence
One Pipeline. Three Different Oil Volumes.
Maximum engineering capacity, the barrels being pumped inland and the crude loaded aboard Red Sea tankers are separate measures. Confusing them can dramatically overstate the impact of an interruption.
Published oil-flow evidence
Each figure below retains its own date, definition and original source. They are not simultaneous daily measurements.
Measurement
Published figure
Period
Evidence
What it measures
What it does not mean
East-West stated maximum capacity
7.0m bpdCapacity
Current stated capability
Saudi Energy Ministry / industry disclosures; IEA caveat on sustained maximum
Maximum reported physical transportation capacity of the pipeline system
It is not verified current throughput, and not seven million barrels of exports every day.
Pipeline throughput recovery
5.8m bpdThroughput
October 6, 2026
Saudi Energy Minister at Energy Intelligence Forum
Crude moving through the inland pipeline system at a reported point in time
It is not a November 9 reading or a same-day Yanbu tanker loading measurement.
Crude rerouting estimate
~4.0m bpdApproximation
2026 crisis period
Reuters November 9 description of volumes rerouted toward Yanbu
Approximate oil volumes redirected away from Hormuz-dependent exports
Not verified as the exact export or pipeline flow on the attack day.
Yanbu tanker loadings
~3.1m bpdTracked export flow
October 2026 estimate
Kpler analyst figures cited by Forbes Middle East
Estimated crude loading activity at Red Sea tanker terminals
Does not count all inland transportation to refinery customers.
Post-September recovery loadings
~2.5m bpdTracked export flow
Sept. 17 to Oct. 4
Kpler analysis of approximately 45 million barrels over the period
Average observed Red Sea terminal tanker-loading volume during recovery
Not the pipeline's maximum or a confirmed November loading rate.
High Red Sea loading period
4.3m bpdHistorical export flow
June 2026
Kpler analysis of route restructuring
Red Sea crude shipments during an earlier high-use phase
Not necessarily sustainable through all seasons, port conditions and security events.
Potential future expansion
10m bpdUnder study
October–November 2026 statements
Energy Ministry discussion and Aramco engineering review
A potential larger future inland transfer system
Not installed, approved or available capacity today.
CONTINUED TABLE / HORIZONTAL SCROLL
The scale of the Red Sea tanker operation
~2 VLCC
Equivalent cargoes per day at 4m barrels
A two-million-barrel VLCC cargo is a useful unit for understanding the scale of reported rerouting. This is cargo-equivalent arithmetic, not a verified daily count of vessels arriving or loading.
~9m bbl
Historical west-coast export storage estimate
Kpler's September 2026 assessment of Yanbu inventories following the earlier attack. It is not an updated inventory balance following the November incident.
Where an inland disruption could become a tanker disruption
01 / TRANSFER
Pipeline flow
A future reduction would first constrain crude volumes available in the west, depending on operating conditions.
02 / INVENTORY
Storage buffer
Available crude already near the coast could temporarily protect refinery runs or ship loading.
03 / TERMINAL
Berth loadings
Once additional crude is unavailable, nominated cargoes could face reduced or rescheduled loadings.
04 / SHIPPING
Voyage execution
Charter timing, demurrage exposure, alternate sourcing and freight requirements could change.
Methodology: “mbpd” means million barrels per day. All quantities are drawn from differently dated Saudi government, Reuters and Kpler reporting. Some estimates may be revised as vessel tracking and cargo confirmation improve. No November 9 tanker loading interruption or storage drawdown has been verified.
ShipUniverse Interactive | Energy Security & Tanker Economics
If the Hormuz Bypass Stops, How Long Can Yanbu Keep Loading Tankers?
Model potential disruption to Saudi Red Sea crude exports by changing pipeline throughput, western refinery demand, terminal capacity and storage inventory. The default reflects the officially reported November 9 outcome: no reduction in pipeline operations.
01 / Select an operating scenario
02 / Pipeline, refinery and terminal assumptions
Published maximum; not observed flow
October 6 reference, not November 9 measurement
Illustrative priority allocation; not current published demand
October loading estimate, used as scenario baseline
Hypothetical terminal operating limit
0% is reported; any reduction is hypothetical
Hypothetical starting inventory; not measured November 9
03 / Cargo and vessel economics
Approximately one VLCC-size cargo
Model boundaries: Pipeline flow first supports the selected priority inland demand. The remaining crude can supply marine loading up to the modeled target. A fixed export-only inventory buffer is drawn down before any export shortfall. This simplified model does not include new Gulf-coast routing, incoming inventory, tanker scheduling, refinery storage or changes in oil production.
04 / Modeled export impact
Cumulative crude loading shortfall
0.00m bbl
Under the selected zero-disruption assumption, the model has no pipeline-related export shortfall.
3.10m bpdBaseline modeled marine loading rate before the simulated disruption
5.80m bpdPipeline flow after selected hypothetical reduction
0.00m bblExport storage drawn over scenario period
5.00m bblUnused modeled export storage
0.0Reference VLCC-size cargo equivalents deferred, not actual ships delayed
$0Illustrative reference value of crude not loaded on schedule; not lost oil revenue
$0Hypothetical vessel-time cost on deferred cargo equivalents
21.70m bblTotal loaded barrels across the scenario period
Scenario Accounting
Undisrupted modeled exports over period21.70m bbl
Crude delivered from pipeline to marine loading21.70m bbl
Additional crude released from export storage0.00m bbl
Total cargo loaded21.70m bbl
Potential deferred cargo0.00m bbl
How Much Does a Larger Pipeline Loss Change Exports?
The five cases use the same duration, storage and tanker-demand assumptions. Every value updates as inputs change. These are hypothetical outcomes, not observed impacts of the November 9 attack.
0% reduction0.0mBarrels deferred
25% reduction0.0mBarrels deferred
50% reduction0.0mBarrels deferred
75% reduction0.0mBarrels deferred
100% reduction0.0mBarrels deferred
Cumulative Cargo Shortfall by Day
The chart accounts for the assumed export storage buffer being drawn down. A flat line at zero means modeled pipeline supply and inventory are sufficient for the selected loadings.
Daily cumulative shortfall in million barrels.
Daily Cargo Balance
Pipeline-supplied marine crude plus inventory withdrawals equals actual modeled loadings. Unloaded barrels are deferred, not permanently lost.
Day
Pipeline to ships (m bbl)
Storage used (m bbl)
Loaded (m bbl)
Cumulative shortfall (m bbl)
ShipUniverse methodology: Officially, November 9 pipeline operations were unaffected. Every simulated reduction greater than zero represents a future hypothetical event. Historical figures for capacity (7m bpd), October 6 throughput (5.8m bpd) and October tanker loadings (approximately 3.1m bpd) come from different dated sources. Priority inland demand, storage inventory, terminal limit, oil price, tanker waiting cost and event duration are illustrative editable inputs. A cargo-equivalent shortfall is not an observed queue of vessels, and gross crude value is not profit, a realized loss or a market price forecast. The model does not establish maritime safety, insurance availability, alternative-route viability or actual Aramco inventories.
Feedback Welcome
We welcome your feedback, suggestions, corrections, and ideas for enhancements.
