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New tanker-market analysis published on November 18, 2026, shows that Suezmax and Aframax tankers carried more than 2 million barrels of oil per day through the Strait of Hormuz in October, according to Vortexa figures cited by Bloomberg. Total daily oil exports through the waterway were estimated at 11.4 million barrels. The smaller tankers have increasingly loaded Iraqi, Kuwaiti and Qatari cargoes, either delivering them directly to overseas ports or transferring oil to other vessels after passing through Hormuz. The change follows attacks on very large crude carriers (VLCCs), which have reduced supertanker availability for Gulf shipments. The figures describe October trade activity reported in November, not shipments recorded on November 18.
Hormuz's Tanker Model Is Changing
Smaller crude carriers are taking a greater role in Gulf exports, but VLCCs remain central to the shuttle system. The commercial impact extends beyond the Strait of Hormuz into vessel availability, freight pricing and offshore transfer capacity.
Market snapshots: Bloomberg/Vortexa, November 18; BRS Shipbrokers, November 9. The first two figures concern October oil flows; the latter two describe fleet deployment. They are not interchangeable measures.
Supertankers Are Being Supplemented, Not Replaced
VLCCs still dominate the Gulf shuttle fleet, with roughly 100 of the 141 dedicated vessels identified by BRS. What has changed is the growing use of Suezmax and Aframax tonnage for cargoes previously more dependent on larger ships. Smaller liftings give exporters additional vessel options when supertankers are unavailable or commercially unattractive.
The change does not remove the danger of transiting Hormuz. It changes how cargoes, vessels and onward voyages are organized around that danger.
Oil Is Moving Through a Two-Leg Network
The shuttle model separates the voyage through the higher-risk strait from the subsequent transport to customers. The expanding role of smaller tankers makes the system more flexible, but also increases the importance of matching vessels, cargoes and transfer windows.
A shuttle voyage occupies the original tanker, while an offshore transfer may require another tanker, marine support, a suitable weather window and time at anchor. Moving the same barrel can therefore consume more vessel-days even when the sailing distance of the first leg is short.
Two vessels illustrate the transition
| Vessel | Reported Activity | What It Demonstrates |
|---|---|---|
| LUCIA ASuezmax | At least four Iraqi cargoes lifted since June, with deliveries to other ships in the Gulf of Oman or to Ain Sukhna, Egypt. A fifth Iraqi cargo was loaded in early November. | Repeated smaller-tanker employment serving both offshore transfers and direct delivery. |
| TURESuezmax | Loaded its third Iraqi cargo in the week before November 18, after earlier employment moving Russian crude to India. | Tonnage can be redeployed from other crude trades into the Gulf shuttle market. |
Vessel movements reported by Bloomberg from ship-tracking data. These examples are not a complete registry of shuttle vessels.
Smaller Can Be Cheaper, but the Calculation Is Changing
Shipbrokers cited by Bloomberg assessed a Persian Gulf-to-China Suezmax voyage at approximately one-third to just under one-half of the published VLCC freight benchmark for the same route. The comparison is striking, but voyage price alone does not establish the lowest cost per delivered barrel.
At illustrative capacities of 1 million barrels for a Suezmax and 2 million for a VLCC, that voyage-rate relationship equates to roughly 66% to just under 100% of the VLCC's freight cost per barrel, before additional transfer, insurance, waiting and handling expenses.
VLCC rates have already retreated sharply from October's extraordinary peak. Reuters reported that the Gulf of Oman-to-China VLCC benchmark fell from Worldscale 841 on October 8 to approximately Worldscale 308 on November 13, a 64% decline. This is a different loading basis from the Gulf-to-China Suezmax comparison above and must not be treated as a directly matched fixture.
| Commercial Factor | Smaller Tanker Advantage | Potential Offset |
|---|---|---|
| Availability | Access to a wider range of vessel sizes | Competition for suitable Aframax and Suezmax tonnage |
| Freight | Lower quoted total voyage cost in the reported comparison | Less cargo capacity per voyage and extra relay costs |
| Scheduling | Smaller parcels and additional routing options | STS delays, weather windows and receiving-vessel coordination |
| Security | Alternative vessel-deployment strategies | Attack risk, insurance constraints and cargo-compliance exposure remain |
The Shuttle Network Is Growing More Complex
Vortexa research published November 19 provides an additional view of the oil relay. It estimates that Gulf shuttle volumes excluding Iran increased from 5.7 million barrels per day in August to 8.5 million in October. That is approximately 49% growth within this separately defined shuttle-flow series.
Million barrels per day, Vortexa's Gulf shuttle-relay measure excluding Iran. These flows overlap with broader export and transit totals and must not be added to them.
That analysis identified 231 tankers participating in shuttle operations since March, of which 130 appeared on Iran's November 2 Persian Gulf Strait Authority non-compliance list. These vessels accounted for approximately three-quarters of recorded shuttle runs. The 231 figure is a cumulative participating fleet, unlike BRS's narrower 141-vessel dedicated fleet estimate.
Vortexa found evidence of additional ship-to-ship transfers among certain designated vessels. In one documented cargo chain, oil moved from a listed VLCC to an intermediate tanker off Fujairah before being split between two further vessels for delivery to China and Singapore. Extra links can preserve cargo movement but increase coordination requirements, documentation complexity and vessel utilization.
Three Variables Will Determine the Next Phase
Shuttle Turnaround
25 → 14 daysBRS estimates that the average time for shuttle ships to enter the Gulf, load and depart shortened from 25 days in August to 14 days in its November assessment. This measures the Gulf-side cycle, not the entire delivery chain.
Offshore Transfer Capacity
STS bottlenecksReceiving-vessel availability, anchorage congestion and transfer windows can hold up cargoes even after a successful Hormuz crossing. BRS has reported waiting times extending to several weeks in some cases.
Security and Compliance
Persistent exposureContinued attacks, Iran's vessel-designation measures and U.S. blockade enforcement complicate deployment and cargo screening. An offshore transfer does not by itself remove security or cargo-origin obligations.
Signals to Watch
Bloomberg's November 18 report cites more than 2 million barrels per day on smaller tankers and 11.4 million barrels per day in total Hormuz exports for October. A November 19 article distributed under a Reuters credit carries different figures, above 1 million and 10.3 million respectively, without an available reconciliation. Separately, Reuters reported a broader October Gulf crude, condensate and refined-product estimate of 17.1 million barrels per day on November 3. These measures should not be merged into a single series. Tracking gaps and subsequent satellite confirmation can also lead to revisions. The lead figures in this report follow the November 18 Bloomberg snapshot.
The emerging Hormuz trade is not a straightforward transition from large tankers to small ones. It is a more complicated transport network in which additional vessel classes, offshore transfers and security constraints determine how efficiently Gulf oil reaches buyers. For shipowners, the central commercial question is increasingly how much usable vessel capacity remains after accounting for risk, waiting time and the full cargo-delivery chain.
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