The New Chokepoint Map: 9 Flashpoints Every Shipowner Watches Before Fixing a Voyage

• Houthi attacks since late 2023 have sunk and damaged merchant ships and caused crew casualties, keeping the lane at the top of risk lists.
• War risk premiums for Red Sea transits have roughly doubled from pre-crisis levels on exposed traffic.
• Container transits via Suez remain well below 2023 levels, with most mainline carriers still routing via the Cape and only limited case-by-case returns.
• Any pause in attacks is treated as fragile. Most planning assumes elevated risk and cost through at least 2025.

Working assumption in many planning decks: risk remains high, with changes driven more by politics and naval posture than by shipping demand alone.

• Set a clear policy on when ships can use the corridor, when they must detour and when they must decline fixtures.
• Document who is responsible for deciding on route changes when new advisories or incidents occur during the voyage.
• Clarify in writing who pays war risk premium, kidnap and ransom cover, security measures and extra steaming days.
• Keep an updated, one-page summary of flag, insurer and naval guidance attached to voyage instructions.

• Difference in earnings between ships that accept Red Sea transits and those that require Cape routes on similar trades.
• Total cost of war risk, fuel, carbon and time for both options at current price levels rather than only on distance sailed.
• How quickly insurers change pricing or conditions after any shift in attack patterns or naval presence.
• Capacity swings between Suez and Cape that can tighten or loosen freight markets on your core lanes.

• Black Sea remains a live conflict zone with drone and missile strikes on ports and infrastructure alongside drifting mines and electronic interference.
• Recent naval drone attacks on tankers linked to Russian exports have pushed war risk premiums higher for calls at Ukrainian and Russian ports.
• Turkey still uses the Montreux Convention framework to keep civilian trade moving while limiting warship movements, which preserves the straits as a narrow but functioning commercial gateway.
• Grain and energy flows continue, but under a fragile balance that depends on Russian and Ukrainian targeting choices and on how far Turkey is willing to go as gatekeeper.

Planning view for many fleets: assume persistent elevated risk and pricing, with short notice spikes when attacks or political statements change the temperature.

• Separate your view by port group: Ukrainian ports, Russian Black Sea ports, and other regional ports such as Constanta, Varna and Batumi.
• Confirm current war risk and cargo insurance conditions for each group. Rates and exclusions can differ sharply by flag, cargo type and destination.
• Check whether your counterparties expect transit under particular grain or energy arrangements and how they treat delays or closures of the straits.
• Make sure masters and operators understand Turkish Straits reporting, pilotage and traffic rules so that added war risk is not combined with avoidable navigation incidents.

• Seven day war risk quotes for calls at Ukrainian ports compared with Russian ports and how quickly they move after each attack or statement.
• Changes in cargo war insurance pricing for grain and oil that can make some trades uneconomic even if hull cover is still available.
• Waiting times and convoy patterns near the straits and at key Black Sea ports, since small hold ups can erase the margin on short regional trips.
• Alternative routing or sourcing that charterers start to use, such as shifting load ports or switching to rail and pipeline, which can change demand for tonnage on your preferred routes.

• The area has seen repeated tanker boardings and seizures over the last few years linked to disputes between Iran, Western states and regional neighbours.
• War risk pricing and routing advice move quickly after each boarding, missile test or nearby drone incident, even if traffic volume stays high.
• Most crude and LNG export programs from key Gulf producers still rely on Hormuz, so full avoidance is rarely practical; instead, owners manage counterparties, flag and security posture.
• Naval coalitions and national escorts reduce some risks but do not remove the chance of targeted detentions, electronic interference or small boat approaches to individual ships.

Working view: the strait remains open but contested, with short notice spikes in perceived risk that can affect which ships and flags charterers prefer.

• Consider separate rules for crude, products, chemical and gas ships, especially when they trade to or from ports that have featured in recent detentions.
• Review counterparty lists for trades through Hormuz and decide where you will still lift business, where you will require a premium and where you decline.
• Check how flag state, P&I and war risk insurers currently view the area and whether they have issued any special reporting or routing guidance.
• Ensure masters have clear, practical instructions for transiting the traffic separation scheme, responding to radio calls and escalating suspicious approaches.

• Changes in war risk premiums for tankers serving Gulf load ports and how those changes compare with other high-risk areas.
• Time charter rate spreads between ships that regularly trade through Hormuz and those that are kept on lower risk routes.
• Patterns in detentions or boardings, including which flags, cargoes or counterparties are most often involved.
• Any shift in energy export patterns, such as increased pipeline or alternative route use, that could reduce or concentrate seaborne demand through the strait.

• Chinese military drills, overflights and simulated attacks around the Taiwan Strait continue to raise the risk profile even in the absence of open conflict.
• Multiple navies now conduct regular freedom of navigation transits, which keeps the lane open in practice but also keeps tension elevated.
• Scenario work by governments and shippers assumes that a serious crisis could push traffic east of Taiwan through the Luzon and Miyako Straits, with longer routes and lost port calls in mainland China.
• The wider South China Sea remains disputed, with collisions, close encounters and temporary exclusion zones near reefs and shoals that can complicate routing and scheduling.

For most fleets the base case is continued access with background tension, but contingency plans now exist for partial or full loss of Taiwan Strait or selected South China Sea lanes.

• Identify which loops and contracts actually depend on the Taiwan Strait and which could be re-routed through the Luzon or Miyako Straits if needed.
• Agree in advance how you will handle temporary no sail zones or missile exercise areas that intersect normal lanes.
• Review charter wording on deviation, alternative routing and schedule impact for trades that rely on just in time calls in China, Taiwan, Japan and Korea.
• Keep bridge and operations teams briefed on current advisory graphics so that routing software, naval warnings and commercial priorities line up.

• Any sustained change in insurance pricing, especially if war risk type surcharges start to appear for selected lanes or ports.
• Extra steaming time and bunker cost for detours around Taiwan in realistic contingency routes, not only in extreme invasion scenarios.
• How quickly charterers shift cargo to alternative ports or routings when drills or political events tighten local schedules.
• Changes in slot allocation and schedule reliability on core East Asia services that could affect equipment balances and backhaul economics.

• The 2023–2024 drought cut daily transits and draft, forcing some ships to queue for weeks or detour via Suez, Cape routes or US land bridges.
• Rains and water management measures have restored daily transit capacity closer to normal and by 2025 transits sit below the number of available slots.
• The Canal Authority is raising revenue through toll changes and slot products while planning new reservoirs to protect against the next severe dry season.
• Climate studies and recent experience treat water stress as a recurring feature rather than an exception, which keeps the canal on long term risk maps.

Many fleets now treat Panama as a climate sensitive chokepoint that works very well most years but can suddenly tighten, with ripple effects on Suez, US ports and Cape routes.

• Track current draft limits and daily slot availability for both Panamax and Neopanamax locks on the trades you actually use.
• Decide your position on auction slots and long term slot allocation products so operations know when they can bid and at what ceiling.
• Compare canal routing with Suez or US intermodal options by season, not just on a generic distance basis, and document the trigger points for switching.
• Make sure charter and service contracts reflect how you handle canal delays, draft restrictions and last minute slot changes.

• Spread in freight and spot rates between Asia to US Gulf or East Coast services via Panama and competing routes via Suez or the US West Coast.
• Slot auction prices and how often they clear near your defined ceiling, which signals how tight or relaxed the canal really is.
• Any new draft cuts or daily transit reductions announced for upcoming dry seasons and how quickly cargo owners react with routing changes.
• Progress on water projects such as new reservoirs, which will shape how often and how severe future climate related restrictions may be.

• Red Sea attacks since late 2023 pushed a large share of Asia to Europe traffic away from Suez, with many mainline services routing via the Cape instead.
• The canal itself remains open and secure under Egyptian control, but its value to owners depends heavily on the perceived risk in the southern approaches.
• Even a single grounding or high profile incident in the canal can cause global disruption, as seen in the 2021 blockage, and this remains a live planning scenario.
• Eastern Mediterranean ports near conflict zones and disputed waters add another layer of risk on top of transit cost, especially for energy and military related cargoes.

Many planning decks now treat Suez as part of a wider corridor with Red Sea, Eastern Med and Cape options rather than a simple fixed link between two oceans.

• Look at the full chain of risk from Eastern Med ports through Suez into the Red Sea, not at the canal in isolation.
• Agree case by case rules for when a voyage can use Suez, when it should go via the Cape and when it should be declined.
• Make sure charter wording, voyage orders and internal memos all align on who decides route changes and who pays if plans shift after fixing.
• Check port and canal conditions frequently, including any new depth, convoy, security or delay notices that can change transit times.

• Spread in earnings between Suez capable and non Suez capable ships on similar East West trades.
• Extra fuel, carbon and time cost of Cape routes compared with Suez at current bunker levels and time charter rates.
• How quickly liner and tanker schedules shift back toward Suez after any easing of Red Sea tension and whether that change looks durable.
• Canal toll changes and any new surcharges that alter the economics for marginal cargoes and ship sizes.

• Sabotage of gas pipelines and damage to power and telecom cables since 2022 turned the region into a focus area for undersea infrastructure security.
• Investigations and naval patrols have highlighted unusual patterns of survey, anchor handling and cable contact near critical lines and offshore wind farms.
• European states now describe the North Sea and Baltic as part of a wider hybrid conflict environment where shipping, energy and data links are all potential targets.
• Most commercial ships continue to trade normally but face tighter monitoring, new reporting rules and possible restrictions in sensitive zones and around infrastructure.

The base case is continued safe passage with more surveillance and occasional investigations, but planners now model targeted disruptions to infrastructure and routing as part of their risk work.

• Know which of your regular routes cross or pass close to major power cables, data lines and gas pipelines and how local authorities expect ships to behave there.
• Ensure procedures for anchoring, fishing and subsea work in these areas match current notices from coastal states and VTS centres.
• Brief crews on how to handle requests for information, boarding or inspection from coast guards and navies that are protecting infrastructure.
• For specialised tonnage such as cable layers, offshore support and wind farm service vessels, treat security and navigation rules as central to commercial planning, not as afterthoughts.

• Shifts in war risk or security surcharges for Baltic and North Sea ports compared with pre 2022 baselines.
• Changes in day rates and utilisation for cable ships, guard vessels and offshore support craft as states and energy firms increase protection work.
• Any new routing, anchoring or speed restrictions near wind farms and cable corridors that could change voyage times and fuel burn.
• Insurance conditions relating to damage of subsea infrastructure that can change your liability picture when operating in crowded corridors.

• Reported attacks are lower than the peak years, but armed robbery, boarding attempts and short duration kidnaps still cluster off Nigeria and neighbours.
• Naval patrols, industry reporting schemes and best management practice have improved the picture, yet many advisories still mark the area as a high concern zone.
• Offshore oil and gas projects, FPSOs and shuttle trades keep tonnage on station or in repeated short routes, which can create predictable targets if security is weak.
• Insurers and charterers still watch this region closely when they price hull, war and kidnap cover and when they choose which ships and flags they want to employ.

The working assumption for many fleets is that West Africa risk is more manageable than it was, but it remains a place where a single poorly prepared voyage can lead to a serious crew incident.

• Differentiate between deep sea transits, coastal legs and time spent drifting or at anchor near load and discharge ports.
• Check the latest risk assessments and recommended routes from your P&I club, war risk underwriters and regional reporting centres.
• Agree standards for physical security measures, drills and watchkeeping when ships are off West African ports or waiting offshore.
• Clarify with charterers how you handle slow steaming, waiting positions and deviations if security conditions worsen during the voyage.

• War risk and kidnap and ransom premiums for West Africa compared with other high risk regions on similar ship types.
• Any extra cost of guards, citadels, hardening and training compared with the additional earnings that West Africa fixtures offer.
• Patterns in attack locations that might lead you to avoid certain anchorages, waiting areas or routes even if they are not formally restricted.
• How quickly oil and product flows shift between West African load ports and alternative sources when security or politics change.

• Red Sea attacks pushed much more traffic into the Western Indian Ocean and around the Cape, increasing ship density off Somalia and East Africa.
• After several quiet years, there have been new piracy incidents and attempted boardings, including hijackings of merchant ships and dhows in 2023–2024.
• Naval task forces, industry reporting centres and best management practice remain in place, but they are now dealing with both rerouted traffic and a modest piracy resurgence.
• Weather, distance offshore and speed management decisions all have a big influence on exposure, especially for slower or heavily laden ships on extended detour legs.

Many owners now treat this lane as a mixed picture: less intense than the peak Somali piracy years, but no longer low risk given the combination of detours, longer voyages and renewed pirate activity.

• Decide how far offshore you will route detour voyages and what minimum speed and watch standards you expect in higher risk zones.
• Check current guidance from naval missions and reporting centres on recommended transit corridors and reporting points.
• Review physical security measures, citadel procedures and crew training so they match current best management practice for the region.
• Make sure charter parties reflect the extra distance, time and security measures needed when routing around the Cape instead of using the Red Sea and Suez.

• Extra fuel and time cost for Western Indian Ocean detours compared with pre crisis Red Sea routes at current bunker and carbon prices.
• War risk and kidnap and ransom premiums for voyages using Cape and Somali Basin routes versus those still transiting the Red Sea.
• Any clustering of new piracy incidents along particular lanes or seasonal patterns that may call for routing changes.
• How long detours persist after any easing in Red Sea risk and whether that shift becomes permanent in some trades.