10 Port Call Bottlenecks That Quietly Destroy TCE (And How Operators Fix Them)

On many trades the default pattern is simple, the ship runs at near service speed toward the next port, then waits at anchor because the berth, pilot or cargo is not ready. ETAs are copied from the fixture sheet, updated late if at all, and rarely linked to real port readiness. The result is high fuel burn on the last leg, long idle periods off port and a voyage that looks efficient on paper but quietly erodes TCE and adds avoidable CO₂.

Once speed profiles, ETA discipline and anchor time are measured consistently, it becomes easier to retire the sail fast then wait pattern and to show charterers and regulators concrete progress on both earnings and emissions.

Many port calls look smooth on paper because the berth times alone do not show the real queue, the ship arrives on schedule but then sits outside waiting for pilots, tugs or the right tide and daylight window for the channel. These constraints rarely sit on the same dashboard as berth and crane capacity, yet in rivers, draft-restricted ports and weather-exposed approaches they decide whether a call runs to plan or quietly absorbs an extra shift of time and cost.

Once pilotage, tug and tide constraints are measured as a separate queue, it is easier to explain lost hours, compare ports on a fair basis and design trades, speed plans and contracts that respect the real nautical limits of each approach instead of just the nominal berth plan.

In many ports the real terminal starts at the anchorage, not the quay, ships arrive more or less on schedule but then drift or swing at anchor while previous vessels overrun their window, cargo or shore systems lag behind the plan, or the terminal quietly reshuffles the sequence. On the Statement of Facts it looks like normal waiting time, yet from a fleet view this “berth almost ready” pattern stretches port-to-port duration, eats into TCE and makes it hard to tell whether delays are structural congestion, weak berth discipline or issues that could be challenged commercially.

Once anchorage delays are broken down by port, terminal and cause, it becomes easier to decide which queues you simply have to price in, which can be reduced through better planning, and which should be challenged in chartering and terminal discussions rather than treated as an unavoidable cost of doing business.

Even when a ship hits its ETA and the port looks clear, the call can still slip if the terminal starts reshuffling the line-up or revising stowage late, a different berth is assigned, another service is pulled forward, or bay plans are reworked at the last minute to deal with yard imbalances and crane availability. On the operator’s screen this appears as “berth plan updated” or “revised stowage”, but on the water it means extra time at anchor, extra shifts alongside and more handling risk, with very little visibility on how often these changes are eating into TCE and schedule reliability.

When berth and stowage reshuffles are captured systematically rather than buried in free-text notes, operators can pinpoint which terminals genuinely face hard constraints and which simply push volatility back onto ships, and then decide where to concentrate volume, where to ask for better terms and where to reduce exposure.

One of the most frustrating delays is when the ship is on time, alongside and cleared, but the cargo or receiving system is not, parcels are still moving from refinery or tank farm, shore tanks are full or not lined up, or the terminal is waiting for blend instructions and lab results. On paper the call looks safe because the berth was reached as planned, yet the first hours or even an entire shift are lost to cargo readiness issues that never show clearly on the schedule and quietly weaken both TCE and relationship with charterers and cargo owners.

Separating cargo and tank readiness delays from general port time helps operators see which trades and terminals need tighter upstream coordination and which simply require more realistic laycans and berth windows in the commercial discussion.

A port call can look fine in terms of total hours alongside but still be poor from an earning point of view if productivity is low and cargo work keeps stopping, cranes or loaders pause for manning or yard issues, pumps cycle on and off, or simultaneous operations are restricted more than expected. Instead of a steady, high-rate operation, the ship sees short bursts of activity followed by unexplained stand-by, so the berth window is consumed without achieving the lift or discharge that the voyage model assumed, and TCE suffers even though nobody points to a single major incident.

Once berth productivity and stop-start patterns are measured in a consistent way, it becomes easier to see which ports need stronger commercial pressure, which require different service choices, and where operational planning on the owner side can be tightened to protect TCE and schedule reliability.

Port calls often carry a long list of “extras” beyond cargo, PSC or flag inspections, SIRE and vettings, bunkers, lubes, stores, crew changes, technicians, minor repairs and class or OEM attendances. When these are planned in isolation instead of being sequenced around the cargo window, the ship ends up handling them one by one, with cargo pauses, launch delays and repeated set-up and safety briefings. The total port stay grows by hours or days, but the SoF only shows a string of small stoppages that do not clearly add up to the real cost in time and TCE.

Once inspections, bunkers and services are planned as a single sequence instead of separate errands, port calls become calmer for crews, easier to predict for charterers, and less likely to leak days of TCE into small, untracked stoppages.

Port calls do not just follow the tide and berth plan, they also follow the contract. If NOR triggers, laytime clocks and demurrage formulas are built around old assumptions, they can quietly reward behaviour that is bad for TCE and emissions, ships rushing in to tender NOR even when the port cannot handle them, owners treating demurrage as revenue instead of a performance exception, and charter parties that make it easier to argue after the event than to plan a smoother, shorter call in the first place.

When NOR, laytime and demurrage are treated as tools to support better port calls rather than just levers in claims, it becomes easier to align behaviour on both sides of the charter party with shorter, cleaner and more predictable port stays.

Many port calls still leave behind a Statement of Facts and dataset that is good enough for a single claim file but too weak for real learning, handwritten or scanned PDFs, vague delay reasons like “port situation”, missing time stamps around key events, and no consistent coding for what actually caused lost hours. The voyage is then closed, demurrage argued, and the same port, terminal and process issues quietly repeat because operations, chartering and management cannot see clear patterns across a year’s worth of calls.

Once Statements of Facts and port call data are captured in a consistent, usable way, the same painful delays stop being isolated stories and start becoming visible patterns that can be priced, challenged or designed out of future voyages.